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1 Introduction
The Master Lever is an option on a ballot to vote a “straight party” line—i.e., to select all candidates
from a particular party in every race. The Master Lever reduces wait times and discourages roll-off.1
Between 1898–1980 it was offered in 30 U.S. states. Due to worries that it exacerbated uninformed voting
and reduced accountability, however, the practice gradually fell out of favour.2 By 2018, it was available
in just 9 states.
Although sometimes considered a marginal component of ballot design, the Master Lever does reduce
positional voting and ballot non-completion. As a result, the political positions of candidates elected
when the option is present are unlikely to perfectly mirror the political positions of candidates elected
when it is not.
In this paper, we estimate the size and direction of this effect by exploiting post-WWII changes to
U.S. states’ ballot design regulations. For our identification strategy, we use difference-in-differences to
compare the Congressional voting records of senators in two types of states: leavers first had and then
removed the Master Lever (15 states); stayers always offer the option (15 states). Prior to treatment,
leaver and stayer states are relatively balanced on time-varying state-level observables; assuming state
legislatures’ decisions to abandon the Master Lever do not partially correlate with a change in electoral
preferences not picked up by these variables, our approach provides a causal estimate of the Master
Lever’s impact on senatorial policy-making.
We find that more conservative senators are elected and incumbent senators vote more conservatively
when the Master Lever is present; overall, this leads to a 3–6 percent rightward shift in their voting
positions. Although senators immediately adjust to split-ticket voting once the option is removed, our
evidence suggests that ballot design can nevertheless change the composition of a major democracy’s
principle deliberative assembly.
Moreover, when we break the Master Lever effect down by party, we find it primarily driven by Republican
senators. Republican positions shift 7 percent rightward when the Master Lever is present; for Democratic
senators, however, there is no significant change.
In order to investigate precisely why the Master Lever affects each party differently, we construct a
model of electoral competition. Intuitively, the Master Lever encourages partisanship voting. This gives
candidates more room to secure financial and political support by catering to their parties’ agendas
(party loyalty effect). It also shifts the average policy bliss point of remaining positional voters and so
changes the platforms of the candidates they elect (swing voter effect). With or without the Master
Lever, candidates adopt more extreme positions when both party loyalty and swing voter effects push
rightward (Republicans) or leftward (Democrats). But when these conditions coexist with a straight-
ticket voting option, then the latter pushes candidates even further toward extremes by: (i) reinforcing
the likelihood of adopting (more extreme) party platforms; and (ii) reducing the influence of moderate
(partisan) voters.3
To empirically determine the directional pull of the party loyalty effect, we assume each party’s bliss
point corresponds to the median political position of its elected members in Congress and compare
them to average state-level voter positions over the same period. We find both parties’ bliss points
are consistently more extreme than average voter positions, suggesting a negative—i.e., leftward—party
1For anecdotal evidence, see, e.g., Gray (2016).
2For example, in the run up to the 2016 general election, Michigan’s GOP-led legislature banned the Master Lever
ostensibly for these reasons (see, e.g., Malone 2018). (The Democrats had the ban overturned in court before the November
election.)
3If swing voters occupy the left or right tail of the political spectrum, partisan voters are moderate-leaning. The Master
Lever’s presence therefore increases moderate voters’ likelihood of casting a (more extreme) straight-ticket ballot.
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loyalty effect for Democratic senators and a positive—i.e., rightward—party loyalty effect for Republican
senators.
Directly estimating the swing voter effect requires disaggregated data on individual voters’ partisanship
and positions which we do not have. We can indirectly deduce it, however, within the framework of
our model. Since the Democratic party’s party loyalty effect is negative but the Master Lever has not
changed its senators’ positions, our model suggests partisan Democratic voters are more extreme than
the average voter in senatorial elections—i.e., Democratic senators moderate their campaign platforms
in order to attract non-partisan voters (positive swing voter effect).
For the Republican party, however, the party loyalty effect is positive and senatorial positions shift to
the right when the Master Lever is present. According to our model, partisan Republican voters are
therefore less extreme (and non-partisan voters more extreme) than the average voter—i.e., Republican
senators appeal to swing voters on the right of their partisan base (positive swing voter effect).
Swing voter and party loyalty effects counterbalance each other for Democrats but push Republicans
rightward. This dovetails with evidence suggesting Congressional polarisation is predominantly driven
by the Republican party (McCarty et al. 2006). It also emphasises that certain elements of ballot
design may exacerbate differences in party ideology. We therefore join a large body of theoretical and
empirical work investigating the U.S. political system’s increasingly polarised climate and the causal
factors driving it—including income inequality (Garand 2010; McCarty et al. 2006; Voorheis et al. 2015),
foreign competition and local labour market shocks (Autor et al. 2016), mass media (Campante and
Hojman 2013; Prior 2013; Snyder and Strömberg 2010), gerrymandering (Engstrom 2013; McCarty et
al. 2009), electoral dynamics (Halberstam and Montagnes 2015), primary elections (Barber and McCarty
2015; Hirano et al. 2010; McGhee et al. 2014) and campaign contributions (Barber 2016).
We additionally contribute to a growing empirical literature studying how minor elements of ballot
design affect voting behaviour (Chen et al. 2014; Heckelman 1995; Walker 1966). Evidence specific to
the Master Lever suggests it decreases split ticket voting (Barnes et al. 2017; Campbell 1980; Campbell
and Miller 1957; Darcy and Schneider 1989; Kimball et al. 2002; McAllister and Darcy 1992; Reynolds
and McCormick 1986; Rusk 1970), ballot non-completion (Feig 2007; Feig 2009; Kimball et al. 2002)
and participation in non-partisan elections (Bonneau and Loepp 2014). Depending on the context, it
can reduce or exacerbate voting errors (Herrnson et al. 2012; Kimball and Kropf 2005). As we show
in this paper, it also changes senators’ electoral incentives and has a non-negligible impact on their
policy-making.
Although our results are derived from U.S. data, they speak to a broader question of possibility and
ease of voting a straight ticket in an election. Thus, they contribute to the comparative analysis of
electoral systems that vary in the salience and role of election candidates’ party affiliation. Figure 1
illustrates the range of electoral systems in the form of a spectrum: on one end, straight-ticket voting is
mandatory—e.g., elections with closed party lists;4 on the other end, elections are between completely
non-partisan candidates.5
Countries can move along the spectrum by changing the list proportional representation system (Buisseret
et al. 2019; Buisseret and Prato 2018; Kselman 2017), adopting staggered calendars for local and national
elections (Burki et al. 1999; Nickson 1995; Peterson 1997), as well as changing their districting and
primary elections rules (see the literature cited above). Over its history, the U.S. gradually moved away
from partisan elections—first, by introducing the Australian ballot at the turn of the twentieth century
4Ballots that strongly encourage straight ticket voting have been used in a number of Latin American and African coun-
tries including, Argentina, Panama, Colombia, Uruguay, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal,
and Tunisia (Barnes et al. 2017).
5At the national level, non-partisan elections are extremely rare in practice, although they are more common in state
and local elections.
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and then by removing the Master Lever in the years that followed. Since the Master Lever makes straight
ticket voting easier, it boosts the importance of party affiliations in the electoral process. Removing it
corresponds to the decrease in political parties’ influence and to decentralization.
Impossible










Note. Figure shows the availability and ease of voting a straight ticket in different electoral systems and the implied
strength of association between parties and their candidates (from no association (left) to full association (right)).
Figure 1: Party-candidate association in elections
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss our data and identification strategy,
respectively. Empirical results are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we develop a simple model of
electoral competition to investigate the mechanisms driving those results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
To estimate the Master Lever’s contemporaneous impact on policy-making, we use data on U.S. senators
elected (or appointed) to Congress between 1946–2009.6 In Appendix G, we compare our results to the
period just after the introduction of the Australian ballot and up to the end of the second World War
(1898–1945).
As we argue in Section 5, the Master Lever’s impact on policy-making is motivated by a desire to do well
in future elections. As a consequence, it should primarily affect incumbent senators who intend to run for
re-election. We nevertheless include in our sample even those senators who do not. First, U.S. senators
are not subject to term limits and a very high percentage (79 percent) run for re-election at the end of
their term (of which 82 percent are re-elected). Second, perceptions of electoral success predict whether
an incumbent senator will run for re-election or not (see e.g., Moore and Hibbing 1992; Theriault 1998),
suggesting that most retiring senators spend some portion of their time in office intending—or at least
hoping—to run. Third, even when a senator genuinely wishes to retire from public office, the way he
votes during his remaining tenure impacts the future electability of the candidate he (or his party) hopes
will succeed him.7
To capture senators’ policy positions while in office, we use the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE,
a multi-dimensional scaling application developed by Poole and Rosenthal (2015). DW-NOMINATE’s
primary dimension assigns senators dynamic positional scores on the left-right spectrum based on their
roll-call voting histories in Congress.8 Data on senators’ parties, (re-)election years and term lengths
were obtained from the U.S. Senate website and the CQ Press Guide to U.S. Elections.
Data on our variable of interest—the presence of the Master Lever on state ballots—were hand-collected.
To assemble it, we consulted states’ ballot design regulations in force during senatorial elections. We
additionally cross-checked our interpretation of these regulations with data from Klarner (2010) and
6In the event a senator resigns from office, the Governor of his state may appoint a replacement to serve the remainder
of his six-year term or until a special election is held to fill the vacancy. In most states, special elections are held relatively
soon after a senator’s resignation, so senatorial appointments last only a short time (e.g., the remainder of the two-year
Congressional term).
7Nevertheless, excluding the 273 observations (15 percent) from senators who do not run for re-election has little impact
on our estimation results (see Table C.1, Appendix C).
8The first dimension of DW-NOMINATE explains most variation in senators’ voting patterns since 1978 (Poole and
Rosenthal 2007). The second dimension is meant to capture remaining variation and primarily provides additional explan-
atory power for pre-1978 issues that are hard to fit on a single left-right axis—e.g., slavery and civil rights (Carroll et al.
2009).
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National Conference of State Legislatures (2019). Whenever possible, we also obtained images of ballots
held in state archives and searched local newspapers for sample ballots printed before each election. We
were able to determine the presence of a straight-ticket voting option for every mid-term and presidential
election held in each state between 1898–2009.
The data we analyse in the body of this paper include 3,034 observations on 501 senators serving in the 31
Congresses held between 1946–2009. (See Appendix G for additional analyses using data from the period
1898–1945.) Every senator/election-cycle pair corresponds to three observations—one for each two-year
Congress during a senator’s six-year term.9 The Master Lever was present for 1,415 senator-Congress
observations; for 1,619 it was not.
In Section 5 we use the distribution of voters’ partisanship and positions within states to understand
why the Master Lever impacts senators’ policy choices. To empirically proxy for the latter, we take the
first dimension of Enns and Koch (2013)‘s dynamic scale of voters’ policy “moods”.10 Enns and Koch
(2013)‘s indicator is a two-dimensional score that uses public opinion polls to gauge voters’ support for
more (or less) government; as with DW-NOMINATE, explanatory power is principally concentrated in
the measure’s first dimension.11
Table 1 displays observation counts broken down by whether the Master Lever was present on a senator’s
upcoming election ballot. The first panel shows counts for red states (mostly Republican partisan voters),
blue states (mostly Democrat partisan voters), purple states (equal and high numbers of Democrat and
Republican partisan voters) and swing states (mostly non-partisan voters).12 The second panel breaks
observation counts down by the political position of the average voter in a state: in right-wing states,
the average voter is more conservative than the Republican party; in left-wing states, the average voter
is more liberal than the Democratic party; in moderate states, the average voter’s position falls between
each party’s position.13 Although partisanship is strong—particularly for the Democratic party—voters’
actual ideology appears far more moderate.
Table 1’s final panel tabulates observation counts by party. A higher number of Democratic senators
were elected when the Master Lever was not on the ballot; where it was present, however, Democrats
and Republicans were fairly evenly split. No Conservative or Independent senator serving in Congress
between 1947–2009 was elected on a straight-ticket ballot.
The graphs in Figure 2 summarise the Master Lever’s presence and senator and voter characteristics
across time. The number of states with a straight-ticket voting option on their ballots has steadily
declined (top left-hand graph). Senate polarisation meanwhile has gradually increased (top right-hand
graph). (Between 1947–2009 no state adopted the Master Lever.) Pre-1980s, Senate polarisation appears
to have been driven by a left-ward shift from the Democratic party. Consistent with evidence from
McCarty et al. (2006), however, the post-1980 trend is especially pronounced in later years and is more
likely caused by the Republican party.
9Each U.S. state is represented by two senators that serve staggered six-year terms spanning three Congressional meet-
ings. Every two years, at most one senatorial seat per state is up for re-election. Senators in our sample serve, on average,
2 terms. Senators Byrd (West Virginia) and Inouye (Hawaii) served longest (9 terms each). No senator is subject to term
limits.
10Data are only available between 1956–2006.
11We use the version of voters’ partisanship and positions calculated at the beginning of each Congress because it is both
a reasonable match for senators’ expectations of the political climate they will face in their (future) re-election campaigns,
and it isn’t confounded by the policies they will enact in any given Congress. Nevertheless, our results are robust to using
versions of the variables calculated at other times during a Congress—e.g., at the end or after the first year (available on
request).
12Specifically, let p(R), p(D) and p be the fractions of Republican, Democratic and partisan voters in a state and set
b = 0.05: (i) red states satisfy p(R) > p(D) + b and p(R) ≥ 1 − p; (ii) blue states satisfy p(D) > p(R) + b and p(D) ≥
1 − p; (iii) purple states satisfy |p(D) − p(R)| ≤ b and either p(R) ≥ 1 − p or p(D) ≥ 1 − p; (iv) states not falling
within any of these categories are classified as swing states.
13Left-wing states satisfy X < YD, where X is the average voter’s position and YD is the Democratic party’s bliss point
(proxied with the median party- and year-specific Congressional voting positions across all senators); right-wind states
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Note. First row: left-hand graph plots the number of states with the Master Lever over time; right-hand graph displays
average party positions in the Senate over time; the degree of Senate polarisation is the distance between the two lines.
Second row: left-hand graph shows average senatorial positions by party and Master Lever status; right-hand graph plots
the fraction of Democrats elected to Senate by Master Lever presence. Final row: left-hand graph displays self-declared
average voter positions by Master Lever presence; right-hand graph plots the fraction of Republican and Democratic
partisans by Master Lever presence (the fraction of self-declared, non-partisan voters not shown). All positional data are
projected onto a left (0) right (100) axis. State-level data on voters’ partisanship and positions calculated at the beginning
of each Congressional term (see Footnote 11). Data from Enns and Koch (2013), Poole and Rosenthal (2015) and the
authors.
Figure 2: Master Lever presence and senator and voter characteristics across time
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Blue 642 621 1,263
Purple 214 159 373
Red 151 87 238
Swing 402 260 662
State-level political positions
Left-wing 183 108 291
Moderate 1,226 1,017 2,243
Right-wing 0 2 2
Party
Conservative 3 0 3
Democrat 883 749 1,632
Independent 12 0 12
Republican 721 666 1,387
Note. Table displays observation counts by constituent characteristics, where
each observation corresponds to a single senator-congress pair. Panel one
breaks counts down by red states (mostly Republican partisan voters), blue
states (mostly Democrat partisan voters), purple states (equal and high num-
bers of Democrat and Republican partisan voters) and swing states (mostly
non-partisan voters). Panel two displays observations by positional classifica-
tion. The final panel shows observation counts by party. (See Footnotes 12 and
13 for precise definitions of the categories listed in panels one, two and three,
respectively.)
Graphs in the second row of Figure 2 consider the positions and parties of elected senators. The left-hand
graph plots average senatorial positions by party and Master Lever presence. For the Democratic party,
the straight-ticket voting option and senators’ positions are not obviously related. For the Republican
party, however, the Master Lever correlates with right-wing senators. The right-hand graph plots the
fraction of Democratic senators over time by Master Lever status. Neither party disproportionately
benefited from the option before 1986, but the electoral success of Democratic senators and the presence
of the Master Lever are negatively correlated post-1986.
Figure 2‘s final row plots voters’ self-declared positions (left-hand graph) and partisanship (right-hand
graph) by Master Lever status.14 Voters in Master Lever states do not systematically differ from voters
in non-Master Lever states on either dimension.
3 Identification
Our estimation strategy is based on the assumption that the Master Lever impacts voting behaviour
and voting behaviour affects electoral incentives and outcomes. We model this relationship explicitly
in Section 5; the intuition, however, is straightforward. The act of voting race-by-race may make some
people marginally more likely to vote against their party. As a result, there is imperfect overlap between
the set of candidates (and their ideologies) elected when the Master Lever is present and the set of
candidates elected when it is not.
To estimate the Master Lever’s overall impact on policy-making, we apply difference-in-differences to
panel data on incumbent U.S. senators running for re-election between 1946–2009. (For more information
14We proxy for partisanship with the fraction of self-declared Democratic and Republican voters per state and Congress
as reported by Enns and Koch (2013).
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on the data, see Section 2.) To generate treatment and control groups, we classify states into one of
three mutually exclusive groups: (i) “leaver” states first had and then removed the Master Lever (948
observations from 15 states); (ii) “stayer” states have always had the option (945 observations from 15
states); and (iii) “non-participant” states never had the Master Lever on their ballots during the period
we cover (18 states and 1,141 observations).15
Our classification scheme yields one treatment group—senators in leaver states—and two potential coun-
terfactual control groups—senators in stayer and non-participant states—with which to estimate Equa-
tion (1):
yist = β0 + β1 Master Leverst + ηt + ηsj + εist, (1)
where yist denotes the policy position of senator i in state s during Congress t, Master Leverst is an
indicator equal to one if there is a straight-ticket voting option on state s’s ballot for the upcoming
Congressional election year t and ηt absorb Congress fixed effects. To account for remaining time-
invariant selection bias, we also include fixed effects for state-party interactions (ηsj , where party is
denoted by j).16 εist is a senator-, state- and Congress-specific error term.
β1 identifies the Master Lever’s mean causal effect on senatorial positions when the following assumptions
hold: (i) stable unit treatment value; (ii) exogeneity; (iii) no anticipatory removal effects; and (iv)
common trends.17
Exogeneity requires that the covariates we condition on are not affected by the treatment. The time-
varying composition of voter positions and partisanship in a state—as well as the positions of the state
government officials they elect into office—could affect voting behaviour and ballot design. Thus, con-
trolling for them potentially biases our estimate of β1 in Equation (1). Failing to control for them,
however, might as well.
To circumvent this problem, we use senators in stayer states as our exclusive counterfactual control. As
we verify and discuss in Appendix B, voters and local government officials in leaver and stayer states
are relatively balanced on their partisanship status and political positions when both types of states
implement the same Master Lever policy—i.e., before leaver states remove the Master Lever. Their
characteristics are significantly imbalanced, however, when non-participant and leaver states share the
same policy—i.e., after leaver states remove the Master Lever.18 Other covariates included in our primary
specification—i.e., state and Congress fixed effects—are pre-determined.19
The assumption of a stable unit treatment value requires that the treatment applied to one state does
not affect outcomes in another. In our setting, this implies senators in Master Lever states do not affect
the positions of senators in non-Master Lever states. During the legislative bargaining process, senators
from one state undoubtedly do influence senators in other states. Yet the causal root of this influence is
most likely due to direct factors like individual preferences and party principles—which we control for
with state, party and senator fixed effects. Conditional on these variables, we believe it unlikely that
senators continue to affect each others’ positions in a way that partially correlates with Master Lever
status.
No anticipatory removal assumes senators in leaver states do not change their positions in advance of
15No state adopted straight-ticket voting between 1946–2009. See Appendix H for each state’s Master Lever classification
and the years in which the option was available on its ballot.
16Including only state fixed-effects does not alter our main conclusions (results available on request).
17We use a modified version of the terminology in Lechner (2011).
18Nevertheless, directly controlling for voters’ partisanship and positions and/or using senators from non-participant
states as our counterfactual control group does not noticeably impact our results or conclusions (see Appendices B and
D.1). In Appendix D.2, we estimate the Master Lever’s effect with the combined sample of stayer, leaver and non-participant
states. Again, estimates and conclusions are similar to those presented in the main body of the paper.
19Although our primary specification includes party fixed effects (which are not pre-determined), conclusions are similar
if they are excluded from the analysis (results available on request).
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a policy change in straight-ticket voting. This implicitly requires that senators in both types of states
correctly predict the Master Lever’s presence on their upcoming election ballots. Unfortunately, we
cannot know whether this was true for elections occurring shortly after the Master Lever was removed.20
For this reason, we dropped 30 observations corresponding to Congresses during which a senator’s state
abolished the Master Lever.21
We also estimate the following modified version of Equation (1) proposed by Autor (2003). It explicitly
tests for anticipatory removal and gauges the robustness of our assumption that the positions of senators
in leaver and stayer states would have followed similar paths had the former not removed the Master
Lever (common trends):
yist = α0 + α−3D−3 + α−2D−2 + α−1D−1 + α1D1 + α2+D2+ + ηt + ηsj + εist, (2)
where Dt = 0 for all t in stayer states (t ∈ {−3, −2, −1, 1, 2+}); in leaver states, Dt = 1 the three periods
before the Master Lever is removed (t ∈ {−3, −2, −1}), one period post-removal (t = 1) and all periods
after that (t = 2+). Because we drop observations corresponding to Congresses during which a senator’s
state abolished the Master Lever, D0 is not included in Equation (2).
If our assumptions of no anticipatory removal and common trends are both satisfied, senators in stayer
and leaver states should resemble one another before the latter removes the Master Lever, conditional
on our controls—i.e., α−3, α−2 and α−1 in Equation (2) should not statistically differ from zero. We
present these results—as well as our estimates of β1 in Equation (1)—in Section 4.
4 Results
Table 2 displays our principal estimates of β1 (Equation (1)). Columns (1), (3) and (5) include fixed
effects for each state-party (or state) combination and all biennial Congressional terms between 1946–
2009; columns (2), (4) and (6) replace state and state-party fixed effects with senator fixed effects,
allowing us to investigate how the Master Lever impacts individual’s positions.22 Columns (1)–(2) are
estimated on the entire sample; columns (3)–(6) split the sample by party (4 observations from members
of the Independent party not included).
Although not significant, our estimate of β1 in column (1) suggests the Master Lever leads to a 6 percent
rightward shift in senatorial positions.23 The significant figure in column (2) indicates at least half of
this shift (3 percent) is from incumbent senators voting more conservatively when the Master Lever is
present. Given the year-on-year average growth rate in Senate polarisation is only 3 percent, these results
suggest a nationwide change in policy could considerably reshape the chamber’s positional composition,
ceteris paribus.24
The Master Lever has little or no impact on the Democratic party’s position as a whole. Although not
significant, the positive within-senator estimate shown in column (4) provides speculative evidence that
incumbent Democratic senators support policies further on the left once the Master Lever is removed.
Yet this appears to be offset by leaver states electing more conservative Democratic senators after the
20Ballot re-design requires time-consuming legislative intervention (for state-specific examples, see National Conference
of State Legislatures (2011)) and is frequently contested in courts (e.g., Michigan’s effort to remove the Master Lever was
resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court). We therefore assume senators do not anticipate changes to their state’s Master Lever
policy unless a law to adopt or remove it has explicitly passed.
21Including these observations does not noticeably change our results or conclusions (see Table C.2, Appendix C).
22Senator fixed effects additionally account for personal characteristics—e.g., charisma, oratory ability and overall
likeability—that might influence senators’ positions and their state legislatures’ propensity to alter ballot design.
23β1 divided by the average senatorial position in the estimated sample.
24Polarisation is measured as the distance between average Republican and Democratic senatorial positions and plotted
in Figure 2. 3 percent is the average year-on-year polarisation for all years between 1946–2009; since 2004, it has increased
to 7 percent.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 3.209* 1.650** 1.061 1.537 5.168** 1.095
(1.939) (0.803) (2.973) (1.260) (2.471) (0.905)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,863 1,863 1,000 1,000 859 859
No. clusters 61 61 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.876 0.984 0.551 0.957 0.647 0.964
Note. Figures estimate the average treatment effect on senators’ policy-making in untreated leaver states (β1 in Equa-
tion (1)), where senators in stayer states serve as the counterfactual control group. Columns (1) and (2) are estimated
on the entire leaver-stayer sample. Columns (3)–(4) and (5)–(6) include only Democratic and Republican senators, re-
spectively (4 observations from members of the Independent party not included). All results exclude 30 observations
corresponding to Congresses during which a senator’s state abolished the Master Lever (see Section 2 and Table C.2,
Appendix C). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party (columns (1)–(2)) or state (columns (3)–(6))
and adjusted with the degrees-of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár
(2016). (95 percent confidence intervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
policy change: β1 in column (3) is close to zero and statistically indistinguishable from it.
For the Republican party, however, the Master Lever is clearly associated with a rightward shift in
its senators’ positions. Column (5) suggests party-wide positions jump 7 percent to the right when a
straight-ticket option is available. Up to a quarter of this may be from changes to the types of policies
incumbent senators support (column (6)).25
Table 3 estimates the Master Lever’s impact under alternative electoral dynamics. Columns (1)–(3)
restrict the sample to senators running for re-election in the current Congressional term, the next Con-
gressional term and two Congressional terms away. The Master Lever appears to have the largest effect
just after re-election; differences between coefficients are not, however, significant. Results in Table 3’s
fourth and fifth columns estimate β1 in the sub-sample of Congresses held during mid-term and Presid-
ential election years, respectively. The Master Lever seems to affect both types of elections similarly.
As discussed in Section 3, if no anticipatory removal and common trends are both satisfied, then senators
in stayer and leaver states should resemble one another before the latter removes the Master Lever,
conditional on our controls—i.e., α−3, α−2 and α−1 in Equation (2) should not statistically differ from
zero. Results presented in Figure 3 suggests they do not. Dark grey figures estimate Equation (2)
using senators from both parties; figures in blue and red split the sample by Democratic and Republican
senators, respectively. Across all three specifications, senatorial positions in stayer states were similar to
senatorial positions in leaver states just before the latter removed the Master Lever.
Moreover, α1 and α2+ are negative (and the latter weakly significant) for Republicans but close to
zero (and insignificant) for Democrats—i.e., the Master Lever shifts senatorial positions to the right for
Republican senators but has no significant effect on the positions of Democratic senators.26 This suggests
that the Master Lever does not produce long-term changes in voting behaviour, an assumption we also
make in our model (Section 5). Instead, senatorial positions adjust almost immediately post-removal
(α1) and remain fairly constant over the long term (α2+).
25β1 divided by the average Republican senatorial position in the estimated sample.
26This is consistent with our results in Tables 2 and 3: because D1 and D2+ pick up the effect of removing the Master
Lever, the signs on α1 and α2+ from Equation (2) are opposite to the sign on β1 from Equation (1).
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Table 3: The Master Lever’s impact under varying electoral dynamics (Equation (1))
Congressional terms to next re-election Election type
This term Next term In 2 terms Mid-term Presidendtial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Master Lever 3.137 2.967 3.619** 3.047 3.428*
(2.400) (2.074) (1.655) (2.038) (1.916)
State-Party effects 3 3 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 633 612 614 962 901
No. clusters 59 59 59 61 61
Adjusted R2 0.858 0.872 0.885 0.870 0.875
Note. Figures estimate the average treatment effect on senators’ policy-making in untreated leaver states (β1
in Equation (1)), where senators in stayer states serve as the counterfactual control group. Columns (1)–(3)
restrict the sample to senators running for re-election in the current Congressional term, the next Congres-
sional term and two Congressional terms away. Results in columns (4)–(5) estimate β1 in the sub-sample of
Congresses held during mid-term and Presidential election years, respectively. Sample excludes 30 observa-
tions corresponding to Congresses during which a senator’s state abolished the Master Lever (see Section 2
and Table C.2, Appendix C). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the
degrees-of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95
percent confidence intervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Finally, the fact that α1 and α2+ are negative (and in the latter case weakly significant), supports our
assumption that upcoming electoral incentives affect senators’ current policy-making. Consider senators
elected at t = −2 or t = −1—i.e., just before the Master Lever was removed—up for re-election at
t = 1 or t = 2—i.e., just after the Master Lever was removed. If Congressional voting patterns were
independent of upcoming electoral incentives, then α1 and α2+ would not statistically differ from zero.
The fact that the latter does for the Republican party suggests its senators use current policy-making
to credibly signal their positions for future election campaigns.
4.1 Robustness
Results are consistently robust to several alternative specifications presented in the Appendix. First,
compared to leaver and non-participant states, leaver and stayer states are relatively balanced on the
positions of local government and voters at the state level (Appendix B). Although there is a slight
imbalance in voter partisanship, conclusions are similar if we re-estimate Equation (1) including it as a
control (Table B.2, Appendix B).
In Appendix C, we replicate our estimates in Table 2 on alternative estimation samples. In Table C.1 we
include senators who did not run for re-election; Table C.2 adds observations from years the Master Lever
was removed. U.S. party politics underwent several changes between 1946–2009—most notably the Civil
Rights movement and Democrats subsequently losing the South (see Kuziemko and Washington (2018)).
We therefore re-estimate Equation (1), sequentially dropping observations from the 80–87th Congresses
(January 1947 to January 1963) (Table C.3), the 88–96th Congresses (January 1963 to January 1981)
(Table C.4), the 97–104th Congresses (January 1981 to January 1997) (Table C.5) and the 105–110th
Congresses (January 1997 to January 2009) (Table C.6).
Appendix D.1 estimates Equation (1) using senators from non-participant states as our counterfactual
control group (Table D.1). To account for imbalance on state-level variables, Table D.2 also controls for
voter partisanship and positions and the positions of state government officials. In Appendix D.2, we
estimate the Master Lever’s effect with the combined sample of stayer, leaver and non-participant states.




















All senators Democratic senators Republican senators
Note. Figures represent coefficients from OLS estimation of Equation (2), where senators in stayer states serve as the
counterfactual control group. All results include state-party and Congress fixed effects. Dark grey figures are estimates
from the entire leaver-stayer sample; figures in blue and red split the sample by Democratic and Republican senators,
respectively (4 observations from members of the Independent party not included). Sample excludes 30 observations
corresponding to Congresses during which a senator’s state abolished the Master Lever (see Section 2 and Table C.2,
Appendix C). Vertical lines correspond to 95-percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the state-party
level and adjusted with the degrees-of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár
(2016). ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Figure 3: Senatorial positions, years to treatment (Equation (2))
Lever policy change (Figure E.1). Appendix F shows 2 with alternative standard errors. In Appendix
G, we evaluate the Master Lever’s impact on senatorial positions starting from the introduction of the
Australian ballot up to the end of World War II (1898–1945).27
5 Mechanism
The results we present in Section 4 suggest that the Master Lever’s presence causes a right-ward shift in
the positions of Republican—but not Democratic—senators. In this section, we use a model of electoral
competition to investigate why.





. Each party j ∈ {R, D} (Republicans or Democrats) has a bliss point Yj ∈ P, where YD < YR.
Each election cycle, two candidates—one from each party—compete for a single Senate seat. yj ∈ P
denotes the political platform of party j’s candidate.
There is a unit mass of voters, indexed by i. xi ∈ P represents each voter’s bliss point; the average voter’s
bliss point is denoted by X. Voters are additionally characterised by their partisanship status, where p
denotes the share of partisan voters in a state, 1−p the share of non-partisan (or swing) voters in a state
and XP the average position of partisan voters. σ is the covariance between voters’ non-partisanship
status and xi. σ > 0 implies swing voters are more right-wing than the average voter in a state.
We model elections as games between candidates and voters. They proceed as follows. In anticipation
of an upcoming election, candidate j adjusts her platform yj .28 Voter i then votes in the election. If
the Master Lever is available, he decides whether to use it. If he does not use it, he goes through the
27In contrast to results presented in the body of this paper, the straight-ticket voting option during this earlier period
was associated with a left-ward shift in senators’ policy positions. Interpreted in conjenction with our model (Section 5),
these results suggest important differences in pre- and post-war party politics.
28Conclusions are similar if parties pick candidates based on their platforms (see Gorelkina et al. 2020).
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ballot race-by-race. Race-by-race voting allows voter i to choose a set of candidates closer to his bliss
point—yielding greater utility—but incurs a cognitive and/or opportunity cost equivalent to the boost in
utility he would have received had he quickly and efficiently “pulled the Master Lever” for his preferred
party.
Voter i ticks the Master Lever if its benefits outweigh its costs. When they do, he chooses either party
R or party D by solving a single utility maximisation problem. When they don’t—or the option is not
available—he goes through the ballot race-by-race, voting for the candidate in each that maximises his
utility for that particular office.
We derive voters’ utility over candidates using the probabilistic voting framework developed by Lindbeck
and Weibull (1987). Voter i’s utility contains three components: (i) the disutility incurred when a
candidate’s platform differs from xi; (ii) a partisanship “bonus”—i.e., an additional pay-off i experiences
when the candidate from his preferred party wins the election;29 and (iii) a random preference shock
specific to i that incorporates factors such as presidential approval ratings and/or candidates’ personality
traits, perceived competence, etc.
Meanwhile, candidates face their own trade-off—one between attracting votes and toeing party line.
Candidate j’s optimal platform balances her desire to win votes by appealing to X with the cost of
losing political and financial support by deviating from Yj . The solution to her problem is found using
backward induction and presented in Proposition 5.1. (All proofs shown in Appendix A.)
Proposition 5.1. The optimal position for the candidate of party j, y∗j , is a convex combination of the
average voter position in the state, X, and the party’s bliss point, Yj, with a drift proportional to the
swing-position covariance, σ. Adopting the Master Lever increases the weight of the party’s bliss point,
Yj, and the effect of the swing-position covariance, σ.
Proposition 5.1‘s intuition is straightforward. The Master Lever diverts partisan voters away from
positional voting so candidates’ platforms have less of an influence on voting behaviour. This gives
candidates the opportunity to either campaign on a platform closer to their party’s position (party
loyalty effect) or steer it instead toward the preferences of non-partisan voters (swing voter effect). Both
effects are discussed below.
5.1 Party loyalty effect
Consider a state in which voters’ partisanship status is unrelated to xi (σ = 0). Senator j’s optimal
position in this case is a convex combination of the average voter’s position in her state and her party’s
bliss point (Lemma 5.1).
Lemma 5.1 (Party loyalty effect). If σ = 0, then introducing the Master Lever shifts the optimal y∗j
away from X and towards Yj.
When the Master Lever is present, candidates can afford to adopt a position closer to their party’s line
while campaigning for office. In moderate states (YD < X < YR), the party loyalty effect leads to more
extreme candidates regardless of party. In left-wing (X < YD < YR) and right-wing (YD < YR < X)
states, however, the Master Lever moderates Democratic and Republican candidates, respectively.
Figure 4 plots the driving force behind the party loyalty effect—i.e., the difference between the average
voter’s position in a state and each party’s bliss point—using median party- and year-specific Congres-
sional voting positions across all senators to proxy for Yj . It suggests a consistently negative party
loyalty effect for Democratic senators—i.e., YD − X < 0—and consistently positive party loyalty effect
for Republicans senators—i.e., YR − X > 0.
29The model’s predictions do not change if the utility function is modified so that electing a “counter-party” candidate






















Note. Figure plots Yj −X—i.e., the driving force behind the party loyalty effect—across states, parties and time. We proxy
for Yj during Congress t with the median party-specific Congressional voting positions across all senators (data from Poole
and Rosenthal (2015)). We proxy for X using the first dimension of Enns and Koch (2013)’s state-level policy “mood”
variable calculated at the beginning of each Congressional term (see Footnote 11).
Figure 4: Party loyalty effect
5.2 Swing voter effect
Consider a state with a small party loyalty effect due to few partisan voters. Introducing the Master
Lever encourages candidates from both parties to chase after swing voters (Lemma 5.2).
Lemma 5.2 (Swing voter effect). If the number of swing voters is sufficiently large, then introducing
the Master Lever shifts y∗j to the right when σ > 0 and to the left when σ < 0.
The swing voter effect pushes candidate platforms in the direction of σ. σ > 0 implies swing voters are
more right-wing—and partisans more left-wing—than the rest of the state. In order to attract them,
senators adopt policies further to the right. Hence, the optimal candidate’s position must satisfy a more
right-wing voter when the Master Lever is present. Similarly, σ < 0 implies swing voters are more left-
wing than the average voter in a state—and therefore partisan voters are more right-wing. The Master
Lever’s presence solidifies the support of the latter so senators move to the left in order to attract the
former.
Directly estimating the swing voter effect requires disaggregated data on individual voters’ partisanship
and positions which we do not have. By combining the direction of the Master Lever’s total effect by
party—small and insignificant for Democrats, positive and significant for Republicans (Table 2)—with
the direction of each party’s party loyalty effect—negative for Democrats and positive for Republicans
(Figure 4)—we can, however, indirectly deduce it (Corollary 5.1).
Corollary 5.1. The Master Lever shifts the optimal senatorial position, y⋆j , to the right if and only if
X − Yj <
3
2
(X − XP ).
For the Democratic party, the party loyalty effect is negative (YD − X < 0) but the Master Lever has
not affected senatorial positions. Thus, Corollary 5.1 implies that XP < X—i.e., partisan Democratic
voters are more extreme than the average voter so swing voters have a moderating impact on senatorial
positions (σ > 0).
For the Republican party, the party loyalty effect is positive (YR − X > 0) while the Master Lever
13
has shifted the optimal senatorial position to the right. Corollary 5.1 therefore implies X > XP—i.e.,
partisan Republican voters are less extreme than the average voter and so swing voters must be more
extreme (σ > 0).
Our model assumes voters are perfectly informed and rational; in real life, however, they’re probably
neither. When voters are prone to certain forms of irrationality such as the “ostrich effect” (see, e.g.,
Panidi 2015), the Master Lever is likely to have an even greater impact on electoral outcomes. In this case,
pulling the Master Lever allows voters to delegate undesirable choices—e.g. voting for party candidates
they explicitly disapprove of—to party elites. Thus, a straight-ticket voting option allows its users to
accrue both the utility they receive from toeing party line while also escaping personal responsibility for
their actual vote.
6 Conclusion
We estimate the Master Lever’s effect on policy-making using data on U.S. senators’ roll-call voting
histories in Congress. Our difference-in-differences estimator suggests the Master Lever shifts senatorial
positions 3–6 percent rightward. The effect is larger the closer a senator is to re-election and the lower
down her race appears on the ballot.
When we investigate the Master Lever’s impact by party, we find it largely driven by Republican senators.
In order to interpret this last result, we build a theoretical model of electoral competition. The Master
Lever saves voters’ the cost of going through a ballot race-by-race, so introducing it increases partisanship
voting. With fewer positional voters, candidates are left with more political energy to either pander to
remaining non-partisan voters—the swing voter effect—or cater to their party’s agenda in order to secure
its support—the party loyalty effect.
Empirically, we find the party loyalty effect induces both Republican and Democratic senators to take
positions more extreme than the average voter in their states. Because the Master Lever does not affect
Democratic senators’ positions, however, our model suggests that their non-partisan voters are more
right-wing than the average voter—i.e., the swing voter effect counteracts the party loyalty effect. But
since Republican senators’ positions shift rightward when the Master Lever is present, the model suggests
partisan Republican voters are more left-wing than the average voter—i.e., for the Republican party,
swing voter and party loyalty effects reinforce each other.
This paper formally establishes theoretical and empirical links between an element of ballot design
common to many countries and the policy choices of elected officials. Although our results are specific
to the U.S., the framework we develop can be used to analyse the impact a straight-ticket voting option
has had in a variety of other jurisdictions.
Our estimates, moreover, are likely lower bounds. Senatorial elections are the first or second most
important races on a ballot, so they are arguably less affected by the straight-ticket option. The Master
Lever should have an even greater impact on electoral outcomes in state and local races since they are
particularly prone to ballot non-completion (for evidence, see Feig 2007; Feig 2009).
Finally, our analysis suggests the Master Lever reduces the weight moderate Republican partisan voters
have in determining electoral outcomes. As a result, Republican senators are pushed to take positions
further to the right than they otherwise would if the Master Lever were absent. This conclusion cor-
responds to evidence that Congressional polarisation is predominantly driven by the Republican party
(McCarty et al. 2006). It also suggests that electoral outcomes in moderate- to right-leaning Master Lever
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A Proofs
Proposition 5.1. It follows from Gorelkina et al. (2020) Proposition 1, where n = 1, and hence γ = ω = 1,










where µ = 1 if the Master Lever is available and µ = 0 otherwise. Proposition 5.1 follows immediately
from Equation (A.1).
Lemma 5.1. Under the lemma’s conditions Equation (A.1) becomes
y∗j = X +
2
3 − µp
(Yj − X) .
It follows immediately that
y∗j ∈ [min {X, Yj} , max {X, Yj}] .
Introducing the Master Lever corresponds to a decrease in the denominator and thus an increase in the
coefficient weighing Yj .



































Corollary 5.1. The politician’s solution in the presence of a Master Lever is given by
y∗j |µ=1 = X +
2
3 − p




and the politician’s solution without a Master Lever by
y∗j |µ=0 = X +
2
3
(Yj − X) . (A.3)
Subtracting Equation (A.3) from Equation (A.2) we get
y∗j |µ=1 − y∗j |µ=0 =
2p (Yj − X) + 3σ
3 (3 − p)
. (A.4)









= X − XP , (A.5)
this implies







B Co-variate balance in leaver and stayer states
Although U.S. senators are federal positions, their elections are influenced by state-level politics. Thus,
a state legislature’s decision to change ballot design may partially correlate with time-varying forces that
also determine the type of politicians its voters elect.1
As we argue in Sections 3 and 5, voters’ state-level positions and partisanship status are the source
of this bias. Unfortunately, directly controlling for either in Equation (1) could violate our identifying
assumption of treatment and co-variate independence: because the Master Lever determines the type
of politicians in power across all elected offices, its presence (or absence) will change the composition of
state governments and, as a result, could eventually influence voters’ partisanship and stated positions.
Because leaver and stayer states are relatively balanced on these variables, we use senators in stayer states
as our counterfactual control group. Figure B.1 plots the average voter position in a state (X) against
its Republican partisan advantage (p(R) − p(D)) in the leaver-stayer (left-hand graph) and leaver-non-
participant (right-hand graph) sub-samples when both groups share the the same Master Lever policy.2
Leaver and stayer states significantly overlap. Compared to leaver states, however, non-participant states



















Note. Scatter plots of average voter positions, X, from left- (0) to right-wing (100) vs. the Republican partisan advantage,
p(R) − p(D) (fraction of Republican minus fraction of Democratic partisan voters), for: (i) stayer and leaver states before
the latter removed the Master Lever (left-hand graph); and (ii) non-participant and leaver states after the latter removed
the Master Lever (right-hand graph). Data from Enns and Koch (2013).
Figure B.1: Covariate balance between stayer/leaver and stayer/non-participant states
1For example, right-wing governments losing ground in state-level elections might be more likely to abolish the Master
Lever. Note that Equation (1) already accounts for all time-invariant forces.
2We proxy for partisanship with the fraction of registered Democratic (p(D)) and Republican (p(R)) voters in a state.
p(R) − p(D) intends to capture relative partisanship weight across parties; results are similar if p(R), p(D) or 1 − p (where
p = p(R) + p(D)) are used instead.
3We draw identical conclusions by re-constructing Table B.1 to compare senators from non-participant and leaver states
after the latter remove the Master Lever. Additionally, similar patterns emerge if we include state government positions in
either graph.
3
B.1 Controlling for state-level characteristics
Table B.1 reports pre-treatment means and standard deviations for X, p(R) − p(D) and the state
legislature’s position (Gov. position) for stayer and leaver states before the latter removed the straight-
ticket option.4 Stayer and leaver states are relatively balanced on X and Gov. positions. On partisanship
status, however, they may be slightly imbalanced. We therefore replicate Table 2 controlling for p(R) −
p(D) and X (Table B.2).5 Despite the smaller estimation sample—data on X and p(R) − p(D) are only
available starting in 1956—treatment effects are similar to those presented in Table 2.






Leavers Stayers Leavers Stayers Leavers Stayers
X Mean 44.37 43.94 45.24 45.52 43.35 42.15
Std. dev. 7.60 7.50 7.31 7.32 7.85 7.29
p(R) − p(D) Mean 50.82 51.93 53.97 54.13 47.03 49.55
Std. dev. 12.21 11.01 9.87 9.72 13.56 11.80
Gov. position Mean −9.52 −13.23 −14.57 −17.64 −3.66 −8.24
Std. dev. 15.48 16.50 16.67 16.50 11.57 15.02
Note. Means and standard deviations of state-level co-variates for senators in stayer and leaver states before they
removed the Master Lever. X is the range of average voter positions, p(R) − p(D) is the Republican partisan
advantage (fraction of Republican minus fraction of Democratic partisan voters) and Gov. position is the position
of state government. Sample excludes 30 observations corresponding to Congresses during which a senator’s state
abolished the Master Lever (see Section 2 and Table C.2, Appendix C). Data on X and p(R) − p(D) from Enns and
Koch (2013) and are only available between 1956–2006; government positions from Berry et al. (2010) and are only
available between 1960–2006.
4Data from Berry et al. (2010) aggregate DW-NOMINATE scores from each state’s governor and major party delegations
to both chambers of its bicameral legislature; they are only available between 1960–2006.
5Results are similar if we control only for p(R) − p(D), X and/or include the positions of state-level government officials
(data for which only start in 1960). (Results available on request.)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 3.068* 1.179* 0.867 0.802 4.128 0.299
(1.862) (0.644) (2.590) (0.916) (3.054) (1.121)
X −0.135 0.026 −0.144 0.050 −0.022 0.030
(0.091) (0.034) (0.137) (0.065) (0.139) (0.037)
p(R) − p(D) 0.000 0.011 −0.057 0.009 0.087* −0.002
(0.037) (0.013) (0.051) (0.012) (0.052) (0.022)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,560 1,560 832 832 724 724
No. clusters 61 61 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.901 0.988 0.543 0.966 0.703 0.971
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that Equation (1) additionally controls for voters’ state-level posi-
tions (X) and relative Republican partisanship status (p(R) − p(D), where p(R) and p(D) are the fractions of partisan
voters from the Republican and Democratic party, respectively). Smaller sample sizes due to data availability: data on
voters’ partisanship and positions from Enns and Koch (2013) only available between 1956–2006. Standard errors (in
parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaf-
frey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence intervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.)
***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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C Alternative estimation samples
C.1 Including senators who did not run for re-election
Although the Master Lever’s impact on policy-making is presumably motivated by electoral incentives,
results presented in Table 2 nevertheless include every incumbent senator, whether they actually ran for
re-election or not. (See Section 2 for the reasons behind this decision.)
For robustness, table C.1 re-estimates Equation (1) excluding these observations. Results are very
similar—and conclusions identical—to those presented in the main body of the paper.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 3.707* 1.634* 1.916 1.761 5.267** 0.509
(2.152) (1.002) (3.317) (1.574) (2.679) (1.026)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,586 1,586 866 866 720 720
No. clusters 60 60 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.877 0.985 0.552 0.957 0.656 0.971
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that 273 observations corresponding to senators who did not run
for re-election are excluded. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-
freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence in-
tervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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C.2 Including observations during years the Master Lever was abolished
To interpret the results we present in Section 4 as causal requires that senators in leaver states do not
change their positions in anticipation of the Master Lever’s removal (see Section 3). This approach
implicitly requires that senators in both types of states correctly anticipate the Master Lever’s presence
on their upcoming election ballots. Because we do not know if this was true for elections occurring shortly
after the Master Lever was removed, we dropped observations corresponding to Congresses during which
a senator’s state abolished the Master Lever. Table C.2 replicates Table 2 including these observations.
Results are similar to those presented in Table 2.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 2.767 0.505 1.003 1.149 4.220* −0.424
(1.785) (0.669) (2.860) (1.031) (2.187) (0.773)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,013 1,013 876 876
No. clusters 61 61 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.876 0.983 0.552 0.957 0.640 0.961
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that 30 observations corresponding to Congresses during which a
senator’s state abolished the Master Lever are included. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and
adjusted with the degrees-of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016).
(95 percent confidence intervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.
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C.3 Sequentially excluding observations across time
Between 1946–2009, Democrats have consistently supported social welfare programmes, business regula-
tion and workers’ rights (including trade union representation). Republicans, meanwhile, have coalesced
around policies supporting small government (including states’ rights), low taxes and a light-touch reg-
ulatory environment. Thus, the post-war policies espoused by both parties have largely resembled the
policies those same parties promote today.
Nevertheless, U.S. party politics during this period has undergone important changes on other dimensions—
most notably the Civil Rights movement and Democrats subsequently losing the South (see Kuziemko
and Washington 2018). To a lesser extent, the Republican party has also experienced a shift toward
more conservative views on social issues (e.g., abortion) sometime around the Reagan presidency (see
Greenhouse and Siegel 2011).
To investigate whether our results are robust across the entire period we study, we sequentially drop
observations spanning 8–9 Congresses starting with Congresses 80–87 (January 1947 to January 1963,
Table C.3), 88–96 (January 1963 to January 1981, Table C.4), 97–104 (January 1981 to January 1997,
Table C.5) and 105–110 (January 1997 to January 2009, Table C.6). Our estimates of β1 in Equation
(1) remain relatively stable despite these exclusions.
8
C.3.1 Excluding the 80–87th Congresses (Jan. 1947 to Jan. 1963)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 2.199 1.214* 0.158 0.780 3.983 0.156
(1.969) (0.637) (2.917) (0.900) (3.270) (1.072)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,374 1,374 719 719 651 651
No. clusters 60 60 30 30 29 29
Adjusted R2 0.914 0.989 0.546 0.975 0.721 0.972
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that 489 observations from the 80–87th Congresses (January 1947 to
January 1963) are excluded. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-
freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence in-
tervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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C.3.2 Excluding the 88–96th Congresses (Jan. 1963 to Jan. 1981)
As demonstrated in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), the Democratic party experienced a sudden
about-face on Civil Rights issues around 1963.6 This ignited a long Democratic decline (and eventual
Republican rise) in Southern U.S. states: “in 1960, all U.S. senators from the South were Democrats,
whereas today all but three (of 22) are Republican.” (Kuziemko and Washington 2018, p. 1).
This change has undoubtedly impacted the political positions supported by Democratic and Republican
senators alike (McCarty et al. 2006). To investigate the extent to which it impacts our results, Table C.4
excludes observations from the 88–96th Congresses (January 1963 to January 1981). We find Republican
senators tend to adopt more right-wing policies when the Master Lever is present regardless of Southern
whites’ partisan allegiance.7






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 3.143 1.543 1.198 0.665 5.091* 0.940
(2.116) (1.249) (2.990) (1.962) (2.941) (1.491)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,322 1,322 653 653 665 665
No. clusters 60 60 29 29 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.877 0.985 0.565 0.967 0.650 0.974
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that 541 observations from the 88–96th Congresses (January 1963 to
January 1981) are excluded. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-
freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence in-
tervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
6Before the spring of 1963, Kuziemko and Washington (2018)’s analysis suggests voters considered Democrats and
Republicans about equally likely to advocate for social change in response to the Civil Rights movement. By 1964,
however, these issues were considered the Democratic party’s exclusive domain.
7During this Era, Southern whites were slightly to the left of non-Southern whites on non-Civil Rights policy issues
(Kuziemko and Washington 2018). The model we present in Section 5 therefore suggests that, if anything, their party
change probably exacerbated the Master Lever’s long-term impact within the Republican party.
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C.3.3 Excluding the 97–104th Congresses (Jan. 1981 to Jan. 1997)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 3.264 2.023 0.228 3.407 5.834** 1.504
(2.423) (1.433) (3.879) (3.403) (2.631) (1.029)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,387 1,387 770 770 613 613
No. clusters 61 61 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.862 0.984 0.573 0.956 0.597 0.961
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that 476 observations from the 97–104th Congresses (January 1981 to
January 1997) are excluded. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-
freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence in-
tervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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C.3.4 Excluding the 105–110th Congresses (Jan. 1997 to Jan. 2009)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 4.280* 1.722** 3.483 1.989 4.911** 1.291
(2.209) (0.861) (3.950) (1.404) (2.295) (0.979)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,506 1,506 858 858 648 648
No. clusters 59 59 30 30 29 29
Adjusted R2 0.868 0.984 0.568 0.959 0.663 0.961
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that 357 observations from the 105–110 Congresses (January 1997 to
January 2009) are excluded. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-
freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence in-
tervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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D Alternative counterfactual groups
D.1 Non-participant counterfactual control group
As we verify in Appendix B, voters and local government officials in leaver and stayer states are well-
balanced on their partisanship status and political positions when both types of states implement the
same Master Lever policy—i.e., before leaver states remove the Master Lever. Their characteristics are
significantly imbalanced, however, when non-participant and leaver states share the same policy—i.e.,
after leaver states remove the Master Lever.
For that reason, we use senators in stayer states as our counterfactual control in Section 3. Nevertheless,
using senators from non-participant states instead (Tables D.1) and controlling for constituent charac-
teristics (Table D.2) does not fundamentally impact our principle results and conclusions.8 (Note that
leaver states are used as the treatment group in both Table 2 and Tables D.1 and D.2.)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 2.440 0.756 −0.288 1.476 5.425** 0.046
(1.969) (0.893) (2.911) (1.236) (2.141) (1.006)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 2,059 2,059 1,099 1,099 945 945
No. clusters 69 69 32 32 33 33
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.978 0.593 0.956 0.635 0.966
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that non-participant states are used as the counterfactual control
group. (Note that leaver states are still used as the treatment group.) Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by
state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and
Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence intervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
8See also Table B.2 in Appendix B, which controls for voter partisanship in the leaver-stayer sample.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 1.804 1.035* −0.699 1.017 3.712 −0.232
(1.824) (0.585) (2.459) (0.884) (2.854) (1.030)
X −0.141 −0.042 −0.084 −0.025 −0.165 −0.019
(0.092) (0.038) (0.148) (0.064) (0.133) (0.046)
p(R) − p(D) −0.045 0.001 −0.122** −0.008 0.061* −0.004
(0.036) (0.012) (0.047) (0.016) (0.038) (0.014)
Gov. position −0.038 −0.011 −0.083 −0.008 0.012 −0.012
(0.032) (0.011) (0.052) (0.020) (0.042) (0.012)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,590 1,590 875 875 702 702
No. clusters 68 68 32 32 33 33
Adjusted R2 0.890 0.989 0.561 0.971 0.707 0.976
Note. Figures identical to those presented in Table D.1 except that they also control for state legislatures’ positions
(Gov. position), voters’ positions (X) and the latter’s Republican partisanship advantage (p(R)−p(D)). Smaller sample
sizes due to data availability: state legislatures’ positions from Berry et al. (2010) only available between 1960–2006.
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-freedom correction proposed
by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence intervals are 1.96 times displayed
standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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D.2 Combined samples
The estimation sample in Table D.3 includes observations from all three state types (stayer, leaver and
non-participant). The coefficient on the Master Lever dummy represents senatorial positions in states
with straight-ticket voting compared to senatorial positions in states without it.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 2.688 1.074 0.242 1.356 5.424** 0.310
(1.810) (0.813) (2.801) (1.215) (2.091) (0.823)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 3,004 3,004 1,619 1,619 1,370 1,370
No. clusters 99 99 47 47 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.866 0.980 0.598 0.957 0.655 0.967
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that the sample includes observations from both stayer and non-
participant control groups. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-
freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence in-
tervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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E Including an additional pre-treatment lag in Equation (2)
Equation (E.1) adds an additional lag to Equation (2) in order to capture the cumulative difference
between stayer and leaver states 4–10 Congresses (8–20 years) before the latter abolished straight-ticket
voting:
yist = α0 + α−4−D−4− + α−3D−3 + α−2D−2 + α−1D−1 + α1D1 + α2+D2+ + ηt + ηsj + εist, (E.1)
where D−4− = 1 in leaver states 4–10 Congresses (8–20 years) before they removed the Master Lever
from their ballots. The other variables in Equation (E.1) are the same as those defined for Equation (2)
in Section 3.
Figure E.1 displays coefficients from OLS estimation of Equation (E.1). As required, α−4− , α−3, α−2
and α−1 do not statistically differ from zero—and for Republican senators, all are especially close to zero.
Thus, conclusions coincide with those drawn from Figure 3—i.e., there appear to be no pre-treatment


















All senators Democratic senators Republican senators
Note. Figure identical to Figure 3 except that five pre-treatment lags are included in Equation (2). Vertical lines correspond
to 95-percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the state-party level and adjusted with the degrees-
of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). ***, ** and * statistically
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Figure E.1: Figure 3, with an additional pre-treatment lag
9Including additional lags for individual years produce similar results—i.e., pre-treatment indicator variables are close
to zero (particularly for the Republican party) and not statistically different from it. (Results available on request.)
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F Alternative standard errors
Throughout the body of the paper we use standard errors clustered by state-party and adjusted with the
degrees-of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016).
Table F.1 reports standard errors clustered by senator. Table F.2 shows standard errors clustered by
state-party but without the Bell and McCaffrey (2002) degrees-of-freedom correction.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 3.209* 1.650** 1.061 1.537 5.168** 1.095
(1.695) (0.779) (2.391) (1.137) (2.336) (0.768)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,863 1,863 1,000 1,000 859 859
No. clusters 61 61 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.876 0.984 0.551 0.957 0.647 0.964
Note. Figures identical to those presented in Table 2 except that standard errors are clustered by senator (in paren-
theses). ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever 3.209* 1.650** 1.061 1.537 5.168** 1.095
(1.837) (0.731) (2.688) (1.030) (2.174) (0.750)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,863 1,863 1,000 1,000 859 859
No. clusters 61 61 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.876 0.984 0.551 0.957 0.647 0.964
Note. Figures identical to those presented in Table 2 except that unadjusted standard errors clusters by state-party are
shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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G The Master Lever’s impact between 1898–1946
In this Appendix, we compute the Master Lever’s impact for the period just after the introduction of the
Australian ballot and up to the end of the second World War (1898–1945). During this earlier period,
we find the straight-ticket voting option is associated with a left-ward shift in senators’ policy positions.
The impact is apparent in both the leaver-stayer (Table G.1) and leaver-non-participant samples (Table
G.2), although it is only significant for the Republican party in the leaver-stayer sample.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever −0.393 0.417 0.462 1.390 −5.057 −0.328
(3.088) (1.494) (4.839) (2.810) (5.629) (2.481)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1,715 1,715 813 813 883 883
No. clusters 75 75 34 34 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.772 0.965 0.548 0.930 0.411 0.890
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that the Master Lever’s effects are estimated on the 56–79th Con-
gresses (January 1899 to January 1947). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with
the degrees-of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent
confidence intervals are 1.96 times displayed standard errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Master Lever −2.025 −2.044* −0.213 −1.908 −7.356** −2.988*
(2.715) (1.119) (3.257) (1.257) (3.602) (1.709)
State-Party effects 3
State effects 3 3
Senator effects 3 3 3
Congress effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 886 886 452 452 412 412
No. clusters 37 37 17 17 14 14
Adjusted R2 0.791 0.979 0.568 0.935 0.427 0.955
Note. Figures identical to those in Table 2 except that the Master Lever’s effects are estimated on the 56–79th Con-
gresses (January 1899 to January 1947) and the counterfactual control group is non-participant states. Standard errors
(in parentheses) clustered by state-party and adjusted with the degrees-of-freedom correction proposed by Bell and
McCaffrey (2002) and Imbens and Kolesár (2016). (95 percent confidence intervals are 1.96 times displayed standard
errors.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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H The Master Lever by state
Before the 20th century, voting in most U.S. states followed the “party strip” system. Single-party ballots
were printed and distributed by the parties themselves and instructions on how to “split the ticket” were
rarely provided.10 In any case, ballots were typically distinguishable by party (e.g., by colour and size),
the ballot box was publicly displayed and party “hawkers” routinely monitored the vote. As a result,
split-ticket voting was rare (Rusk 1970).
In 1856, Australia adopted the following balloting guidelines (also known as the “Australian Ballot”
principles): (i) ballots should be prepared and administered by state government officials; (ii) all can-
didates from both parties should be listed together on a consolidated ballot; and (iii) voting should be
done in secret. By the early 1890s, 90 percent of U.S. states had adopted these principles. As a result,
split-ticket voting increased (Rusk 1970).
Since then, state-level differences in ballot design have been exclusively confined to a ballot’s internal
format. Today, most states have adopted “office bloc” or “Massachusetts” ballots which list candidates
by office. Before the 1970s, the “party bloc” or “Indiana” ballot—where candidates’ names are arranged
by party—were more common. Figure H.1 displays both types of ballots side-by-side.
Straight-ticket voting options can be found on both types of ballots (see Figure H.1). It generally takes
the form of a circle or box displayed beside party names at the top of a ballot. On some party bloc ballots,
running a line through the columns of parties one does not wish to vote for registers a straight-party
vote (e.g., Texas before the 1970s).
Although modern voting machines date back to the 1800s, they were first widely adopted in the 1940s
and 1950s.11 During this period, straight-ticket voting usually involved pulling a “party lever” at the top
or side of the machine. Earlier voting machines tended to require pulling the party lever in order to begin
voting—e.g., in Tennessee before 1952—or else tied it to the vote for a particular office—e.g., in Texas
during the 1970s, voting for a presidential candidate automatically depressed the levers corresponding
to candidates from the same party running in other races listed on the ballot. To “split” their tickets,
voters then had to go through the ballot office-by-office, reversing the vote from the party lever. In later
years, most lever voting machines either did not have the straight-ticket voting option or did not require
pulling a party lever to initiate voting.
Finally, most states consolidate every race on a single ballot so their straight-ticket options are valid across
all partisan elections. In some states, however, ballot design limits the option’s scope. For example, prior
to Ohio’s adoption of the office bloc ballot in 1950, its voters received several ballots when going into a
voting booth: the presidential ballot, another ballot specific to state- and county-level partisan elections
(e.g., U.S. senator, governor or sheriff) and one or more non-partisan ballots (e.g., for judicial positions
and referenda). Ticking the straight-ticket circle at the top of the presidential ballot would not carry
through to the local partisan ballot (and visa versa).
Table H.1 displays states, the years that the Master Lever was present and the categories we use for our
difference-in-differences identification strategy—i.e., stayer, leaver or non-participant (see section 3).
10For example, some states allowed voters to scratch out individual candidates’ names and write above them the names
of candidates from other parties; in other states, voters were required to paste the name of alternative candidates over the
names of candidates they were meant to replace.
11For example, Thomas Edison patented an electric voting machine in 1869. Although ballot design is almost always
governed by the state legislature, the decision to use voting machines is generally decided at the county or city level—e.g.,
one city in a state may vote by machine while another still votes with paper ballots.
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Note. Top-left figure Ohio partisan state- and county-level sample ballot from 1944 in party-bloc form. (Note the straight-
ticket voting option at the top.) Source: Hamilton Daily News Journal, Saturday 4 November 1944 edition, p. 12. Top
right-hand figure Ohio partisan state- and county-level election ballot from 1958 in office-bloc form. (Note the absence of
a straight-ticket voting option.) Source: Hamilton Daily News Journal, Friday 1 November 1948 edition, p. 17. Bottom
figure Nebraska sample ballot in 1932 in office-bloc form. (Note the presence of a straight-ticket voting option on the
top-left hand side of the ballot.) Source: Lincoln State Journal, Thursday 3 November 1932 edition, p. 8.
Figure H.1: Sample office and party bloc ballots
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Table H.1: States’ Master Lever status
Difference-in-differences group Master Lever
State 1898–1945 1946–2009 Present Absent
Alabama Stayer Stayer 1898–2009 1902–1905
Arizona Stayer Leaver 1898–1975 1974–2009
Arkansas Non-participant Non-participant 1898–2009
California Non-participant Non-participant 1898–2009
Colorado Leaver Non-participant 1898–1915 1914–2009
Connecticut Stayer Leaver 1898–1989 1988–2009
Delaware Stayer Leaver 1898–1969 1968–2009
Florida Non-participant Non-participant 1942–1947 1898–2009
Georgia Stayer Leaver 1898–1993 1992–2009
Idaho Stayer Leaver 1898–1953 1918–2009
Illinois Stayer Leaver 1898–1997 1996–2009
Indiana Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
Iowa Stayer Stayer 1898–2009 1906–1921
Kansas Leaver Non-participant 1898–1915 1914–2009
Kentucky Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
Louisiana Stayer Leaver 1898–1981 1980–2009
Maine Stayer Leaver 1898–1969 1968–2009
Maryland Non-participant Non-participant 1898–1903 1902–2009
Massachusetts Non-participant Non-participant 1920–1931 1898–2009
Michigan Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
Minnesota Non-participant Non-participant 1898–2009
Mississippi Non-participant Non-participant 1898–2009
Missouri Stayer Leaver 1898–2005 2004–2009
Montana Non-participant Non-participant 1898–1903 1902–2009
Nebraska Leaver Non-participant 1898–1935 1900–2009
Nevada Non-participant Non-participant 1898–2009
New Hampshire Stayer Leaver 1898–2007 2006–2009
New Jersey Non-participant Non-participant 1898–2009
New Mexico Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
New York Non-participant Non-participant 1898–1915 1914–2009
North Carolina Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
North Dakota Leaver Non-participant 1898–1925 1924–2009
Ohio Stayer Leaver 1898–1951 1950–2009
Oklahoma Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
Oregon Non-participant Non-participant 1898–2009
Pennsylvania Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
Rhode Island Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
South Carolina Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
South Dakota Stayer Leaver 1900–1995 1898–2009
Tennessee Stayer Leaver 1938–1953 1898–2009
Texas Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
Utah Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
Vermont Stayer Leaver 1898–1979 1978–2009
Virginia Non-participant Non-participant 1898–2009
Washington Stayer Leaver 1898–1949 1948–2009
West Virginia Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
Wisconsin Stayer Stayer 1898–2009
Wyoming Leaver Non-participant 1898–1913 1912–2009
Note: Table displays states, their Master Lever category and the years that the Master Lever was present for
mid-term and presidential elections held between 1898–2009.
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